Abstract. One of the most interesting puzzles in formalizing belief contexts is the fact that many belief reports can be given both an opaque and a transparent readings. A traditional explanation is that the two readings are related to the failure and success of the principle of substitutivity respectively, and this in turn is explained with the de re/de dicto distinction. We propose an alternative analysis, based on the idea that another agent's beliefs can just be quoted (preserving opacity) or translated into the reporter's language (allowing for transparency). We show that MultiContext systems allow for the formalization of these two phenomena at the same time, thanks to their multi-language feature.
Beliefs and Substitutivity
A very important capability is reasoning about our own and other people's beliefs. We have beliefs about our beliefs; we learn from other people's beliefs; we accept (don't accept) other people's beliefs among our beliefs; we share our beliefs with other people; we report other people's beliefs; we infer new information by combining di erent people's beliefs; we make decisions based on conjectures about other people's beliefs; many communication conventions are based on what we believe other people believe; and so on.
Despite the pervasiveness of the notion of belief and the apparent easiness for humans to deal with it, representing beliefs and formalizing reasoning with and about beliefs raises very di cult problems. From a logical point of view, a well-known problem is that a very general and intuitive logical principle, the principle of substitutivity, fails in its unrestricted version 1 . Intuitively, the unrestricted principle of substitutivity (UPS) states that whenever two terms (two sentences) have the same meaning 2 , they can be substituted one for the other in any sentence salva veritate. More formally, let be a sentence and ; 0 This fact was rst noticed in 3]. 2 The word`meaning' is used here informally.
Consider the following instance of UPS:
Mr. A believes that the president of the local football team is a corruptor The president of the local football team is Mr. C Mr. A believes that Mr. C is a corruptor
It is easy to see that the conclusion does not logically follow from the premisses.
Indeed, even though Mr. C is the president of the local football team, Mr. A could not be aware of this fact. Given the two premisses, we have no means to conclude whether Mr. A believes or not that the president of the local football team is Mr. C. Hence it is possible to think of a model in which the premisses are true and the conclusion is false. The traditional solution is to introduce a restricted principle of substitutivity (RPS): whenever two terms (two sentences) that occur within the scope of the same belief operator have the same meaning, they can be substituted one for the other in any sentence that occurs in the same context salva veritate. More formally, let be a sentence, a term (sentence), and Bel a belief operator. If Bel( = 0 ) Bel( 0 )], then Bel( ) Bel( = 0 ]). In the example above, RPS can be applied only if the second premiss is replaced by the fact that Mr. A believes that the president of the local football team is Mr. C. In this case, the conclusion holds.
However, there are cases in which this weaker form of substitutivity is not su cient in order to model common forms of reasoning about beliefs. A simple example is the way people report other people's beliefs. Following the analysis of 1], we show that many belief reports can be given two readings, called opaque and transparent respectively, and that the second requires the application of a form of substitutivity stronger than RPS. We argue that both readings are intuitively plausible, and therefore an adequate formalization of beliefs should allow us to model both of them, and not just to eliminate one. To this end, we present and discuss in detail a motivating scenario, which we use also as a case study; then we present a multi-context framework for belief contexts and we show that it allows us to model both the opaque and the transparent readings of belief reports.
Opacity and Transparency in Belief Reports
The scenario we consider is a slight modi cation (and translation) of an example from 1]:
You know that Mr. A believes that the president of the local football team is Mr. M and you know that Mr. B believes that the president is Mr. C. You know also that Mr. B knows that A believes that the president of the local football team is Mr. M. Actually, Mr. B is right, and you know that. Now, B tells you: \Mr. A believes that the president of the local football team is a corruptor". If you want to know whom the sentence is about (besides Mr. A), how will you interpret the sentence?
Suppose that the problem is posed to a computer program. The program is a little puzzled, since the question has two possible answers: . If the program is to reason on belief reports, it must be able to ascribe both attitudes to the reporter. In particular, ascribing the rst attitude will result in an opaque reading of a belief report and ascribing the second will result in a transparent reading. So let us look again at the example from this perspective. Mr. B tells the program that Mr. A believes that the president of the local football team is a corruptor. If the program ascribes to Mr. B the \quotation" attitude, it will reason as follows: since Mr. B is reporting the exact words of Mr. A, and since Mr. A believes that the president of the local football team is Mr. M, the content of the reported belief is that Mr. A believes that Mr. M is a corruptor (opaque reading). If the program ascribes to Mr. B the \translation" attitude, it will reason as follows: since Mr. B believes that the president of the local football team is Mr. C, and since the description`the president of the local football team' is to be read in Mr. B's sense, the reported belief is that Mr. C is a corruptor (transparent reading).
In order to formalize these intuitions, we introduce the notion of view. A view is a representation of a collection of beliefs that a reasoner (in our example, the program) ascribes to an agent (including itself) under a given perspective. 3 . The views that the program can build can be organized in a structure like that presented in Figure 1 4 . Each circle represents a view; some circles are dashed because we will not use them in the formalization of the case study.
As usual, the propositional content of a belief is represented as a sentence of some language. In most traditional approaches, this language is unique and any belief is represented as a sentence in this language. Of course, a sentence can be believed by an agent and not believed by another, but it denotes one and the same 3 Since in our example no confusion can arise, from now on we will omit the pre x . 4 This structure can be easily generalized to n agents. For a more detailed description of the structure, a good reference is 2], where views are used to solve the a well-known puzzle involving reasoning about belief and ignorance, namely the Three-Wise-Men problem. proposition regardless of the agent which believes (does not believe) it. However, our case study shows that di erent agents may mean di erent propositions with the \same" sentence. This is the case of the sentence \the president of the local football team is a corruptor": for Mr. A, it denotes the proposition that Mr. M is a corruptor; for Mr. B, the proposition that Mr. C is a corruptor. Since the de nite description`the president of the local football team' is such that it can refer only to a single person, the two propositions entail a contradiction (unless we can prove that Mr. M is the same person as Mr. C).
Our approach is based on an idea proposed in 6]: there is not a single language that the program uses to describe its views about other agents' beliefs; instead, a distinct language is associated with each view, and the interpretation of such a language is local to the view it is associated with. In this way, we can distinguish the sentence \the president of the local football team is a corruptor" in B and the sentence \the president of the local football team is a corruptor" in BA. Even though syntactically they \look the same", they do not denote the same proposition, and therefore are true in two di erent (and in principle independent) sets of models. This property is called locality, and is a key point in the formalization of the intrinsic ambiguity of belief reports.
The contents of di erent views are obviously related. For instance, it is reasonable to assume that there is a relation between the fact that the program puts into B the belief that Mr. A believes that the president of the local football team is a corruptor, and into BA the belief that the president of the local football team is a corruptor. Any relation between sets of facts belonging to di erent views is called a compatibility relation. A very intuitive relation of compatibility between views is the following: if a sentence of the form belongs to BA, then a sentence of the form \Mr. A believes that " belongs to B (where believes is a belief operator). In this case, we say that B is a correct observer; if the relation holds in the other direction as well (i.e. if a sentence of the form \Mr. A believes that " belongs to B, then a sentence of the form belongs to BA), we say that B is a correct and complete observer 5]. But it is very important to realize that correct and complete observers are not the only possible kind. In fact, for the transparent reading we need a di erent kind of observer, de ned by the following compatibility relation: if BA contains a sentence and B contains an equality (equivalence) of the form = 0 ( 0 ), then a sentence of the form \A believes T that = 0 ]" belongs to B, (where believes T is a belief operator distinct from believes). In the remain of the paper, we show { both model-theoretically and proof-theoretically { that these two compatibility relations are basically the relations between views that we need in order to model opacity and transparency in belief reports.
Belief Contexts in MultiContext Systems
In order to model the properties of locality and compatibility as discussed in the previous section, we formalize belief reports in the framework of MultiContext systems (MC systems). In this section we review only those aspects of MC systems that are needed in order to present our formalization of belief reports. The interested reader may refer to the bibliography for a more complete presentation 5 .
Formally, given a set I of indices, a MC system is a pair hfC i g i2I ; BR I i, where fC i g i2I is a collection of contexts and BR I is a set of bridge rules. Each context is de ned as an axiomatic formal system, i.e. a triple hL i ; i ; i i, where L i is the language of C i , i L i is the set of axioms of C i and i is the set of (local) inference rules of C i in Natural Deduction style 13]. When no confusion can arise, we will refer to contexts using their indices (i.e., we will refer to context C i as i). Notationally we write i : to mean that is a formula of i. A bridge rule is de ned as an inference rule with premisses and conclusion in di erent contexts. For instance, the bridge rule 1 : 1 2 : 2 (1) says that the formula 2 is derivable in context 2 from the fact that the formula 1 is derivable in context 1. In 10, 5, 2], it is shown how belief contexts can be formalized using MC systems. Our work is built on top of this work. The basic ideas are the following.
We imagine that the computer program is able to handle a set I of views representing the collections of beliefs that it ascribes to Mr. A and Mr. B (the set of views of Figure 1 ). Formally, each view i is thought of as a context C i , with its own language, set of axioms and local inference rules (locality). Compatibility among di erent views is modelled by de ning a suitable set of bridge rules.
In Local Model Semantics (LMS), locality is modelled by associating a set of models { in our case, rst order models { and a satis ability relation (written as (2) is the semantic counterpart of the bridge rule (1) . A model for an MC system hfC i g i2I ; BR I i is a compatibility relation C de ned over sets of (local) models of fC i g i2I and modelling the \links" formalized by the bridge rules belonging to the set BR I .
In the next two sections we show how to use MC systems to formalize both the opaque and the transparent reading of the belief report \Mr. A believes that the president of the local football team is a corruptor" (our case study). In order to do this, (i) we de ne the set of contexts (each with its set of local models) representing the views of the example; (ii) we de ne the bridge rules (compatibility relations) representing the fact that the agent B may performs an opaque or a transparent reading of the belief of A.
Representing Opacity
Following 2], we rst introduce the class of languages for the program's views.
Let L be a rst order language containing two constants C and M (Mr. C and Mr. M respectively), a unary predicate Corr (to be a corruptor), and a de nite description P 6 We say that an index i 2 I is \greater than" an index j 2 I if and only if j is a strict subsequence of i (i.e. i = jk for some k 6 = ).
Formalizing Opacity with MC Systems
The formal system allowing for the opaque reading in our case study is de ned as follows:
De nition 1. An opaque system MV = hfC i g i2I ; BR I i is an MC system such that:
{ I 0 and I are the sets de ned above; { for every C i 2 fC i g i2I :
L i is the language of index i in the class of MV languages de ned above; contains the formulae: Bel B (\ P = C"), Bel B (\Bel A (\ P = M")"), Bel B (\Bel A (\Corr( P)")"); i = ;, for any i 6 = ;
i is the set of inference rules of Natural Deduction for rst order logics plus a sound and complete set of rules for equality; { the set BR I contains, for any index ia 2 I, the bridge rules of the form:
where R up is applicable only if is a closed formula and no formula the premiss ia : depends upon has index greater then i. 
Modeling Opacity with LMS
We will now give a model-theoretic account of opacity by de ning the notion of opaque model. (4) Condition (3) says that i is a correct observer because if Bel a (\ ") is satis ed by c i then is satis ed by c ia . Condition (4) says that i is a complete observer. Indeed c i satis es all the formulae Bel a (\ ") such that is satis ed by all the models c 0 ia related (via compatibility relation) with (a subset of) c i , i.e. such that is believed by ia, the mental image that i has of a. Notice that (3) is \weaker" than (4). This fact re ects the di erence between R dn and R up , namely the fact that R up is a \restricted" bridge rule. It means that all of i's beliefs of the form Bel a (\ ") are correct even if they follow from assumptions (and not only theorems) in i. In other words, Condition (3) states the soundness of hypothetical reasoning about beliefs in an opaque model. Now we are ready to show how may use (3) and (4) to perform the opaque reading. The initial knowledge of is BelB(\ P = C") BelB(\BelA(\ P = M")") BelB(\BelA(\Corr( P)")")
This means that any set of local models of must satisfy the formulae in (5).
Constraint (3) 
From the de nition of local semantics as rst order semantics, every c BA satis es also the following consequence of the equality axioms: 
and constraint (4) between contexts and B tells us that every compatibility sequence hc ; c A ; c B ; c AA ; c AB ; c BA ; c BB : : :i is such that c must satisfy
that is C satis es an opaque reading of the utterance Bel B (\Bel A (\Corr( P)")").
Steps (5){ (10)are the model-theoretic counterpart of the proof of gure 3, where the application of constraints (3) and (4) We show how (11) allows B to translate A's belief Corr( P) using its own belief P = C, instead of using A's belief P = M. Since any transparent model is also an opaque model, we obtain (7) from (5) as in the previous section.
Constraint (11) between contexts B and BA, where is Corr( P), tells us that every compatibility sequence hc ; c A ; c B ; c AA ; c AB ; c BA ; c BB : : :i is such that c B must satisfy B ( P = C) Bel T A (\Corr(C)") (13) From the fact that every c B satis es P = C and from soundness of modus ponens in local models semantics 7], we obtain B Bel T A (\Corr(C)") (14) Finally, using constraint (4) as from (8) to (10), we obtain BelB(\Bel T A (\Corr(C)")") (15) which corresponds to the transparent reading of Bel B (\Bel A (\Corr( P)")"), our original utterance.
Steps ( 
Conclusions
The simple case study we have formalized in this paper is clearly an instance of a much more general phenomenon, potentially concerning every belief report where some reference is made to some individual. We argued that a proper treatment of this phenomenon does not involve a formalization of the de re/de dicto distinction, but rather a formalization of two possible attitudes on the reporter side towards another agent's beliefs. In the opaque reading, the reporter is assumed to just quote another agent's beliefs, whereas in the transparent reading the reporter is assumed to translate another agent's beliefs in his/her own words. As a consequence, the \same" de nite description in the rst case is meant to be used in the sense of the agent whose belief is reported, whereas in the second case is meant to be used in the sense of the reporter. This phenomenon is given a general (and quite natural) formalization by exploiting the multilanguage features of MC systems.
The MC approach to belief contexts presupposes a deep change in the attitude toward the problem of formalizing beliefs (and reasoning about beliefs). Indeed, it requires to take seriously into account the fact that logical languages can be used to ascribe beliefs to agents, and not just to describe their beliefs from the point of view of an external (and { in general { omniscient) observer. The properties of locality and compatibility are motivated by this change of perspective, since they allow us not to hardwire in the logic some assumption which are implausible for an adequate logic of beliefs. For instance, we do not assume that the \same" linguistic token means the same thing for di erent agents, or that an agent can always understands what another agent meant to communicate. Misunderstandings happen all often in every day conversation, and an adequate formalization must explain how they are possible. We believe that our notion of views as contexts are a contribution toward such an explanation, and that it can throw a new light on some of the most di cult puzzles in formalizing beliefs (e.g. omniscience, failure of substitutivity, limitations of reasoning capabilities).
